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Conclusion: Critique and the Politics of Afﬁrmation in
International Relations
SUVI ALT
Afﬁrmation refers to “something declared to be true; a positive statement or judge-
ment”1 or “a statement of the existence or truth of something”.2 The question of
afﬁrmation thus takes us back to the problem of truth. What is the truth that is pro-
claimed when afﬁrmation is declared? The contemporary interest in afﬁrmation in
the humanities and social sciences offers various answers to this question and the
contributions to this special issue reﬂect some of that diversity. Pol Bargués-
Pedreny refers to afﬁrmation as an “ethos”.3 As such, afﬁrmation is understood
as a general mode of relating to the contemporary reality. What is being afﬁrmed
is not necessarily the truth of this or that thing, but the current reality as such. Afﬁr-
mation means embracing the world. But how do we understand the world? For
those currently working in the afﬁrmative key, the reality that is afﬁrmed is often
understood in terms of its inherently unstable, indeterminate, interrelated, and
messy character.4 In such accounts, afﬁrmation means positing an ontology that
arguably allows us to see possibilities that have previously gone unnoticed
because we have not been attuned to how the world is. Such afﬁrmation of
notions regarding the character of being as such differs from afﬁrming the truth
of speciﬁc phenomena—actual experiences of injustice, for example. Moreover,
afﬁrming the actually existing world has different political effects than the afﬁrma-
tion of political goals—social equality, for example. All of these notions of afﬁrma-
tion, and perhaps others, appear in current debates concerning the need to do
something other than critique or something more than critique.
1. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, “Afﬁrmation”, (2011), available: <https://
www.thefreedictionary.com/afﬁrmation> (accessed 21 May 2018).
2. Collins English Dictionary—Complete and Unabridged, “Afﬁrmation”, (2014), available: <https://
www.thefreedictionary.com/afﬁrmation> (accessed 21 May 2018).
3. Pol Bargués-Pedreny, “From Critique to Afﬁrmation in International Relations”, Global Society, Vol.
33, No. 1 (2019).
4. See, for example, Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Donna Haraway,
Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Anna
Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins (Prin-
ceton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015). Contemporary afﬁrmative writers often draw on
the various formulations of ontologies of immanence in the works of Baruch de Spinoza, Friedrich
Nietzsche, and Gilles Deleuze. For a short explication of the practice of “afﬁrmative critique”, see,
Kathrin Thiele, “Afﬁrmation”, in Mercedes Bunz, Birgit Mara Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele (eds.), Symptoms
of the Planetary Condition (Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2017), pp. 25–29.
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While most of the contributors to this issue focus on the operation of the afﬁrma-
tive ethos in contemporary political thought, some also identify it being expressed
in different policy discourses. Peter Finkenbusch ﬁnds resilience discourse in crime-
related US security interventions in Latin America afﬁrming the current world
instead of aiming to change it. In these policies, fostering resilience is not about
developing one-size-ﬁts-all technical solutions, but about identifying “the
unscripted, improvised, evolving practices of real people in their everyday life situ-
ations”.5 Pol Bargués-Pedreny and Jessica Schmidt identify the same kind of a shift
in environmental policymaking. Here, too, it is no longer about developing grand
strategies with preconceived ideas about how policy problems should be solved.
Instead, environmental policy is characterised by the proliferation of projects and
experimentations.6 This change in policy-making is partly due to the waning
belief in the effectiveness of grand plans. Finkenbusch points out the way in
which the energy and self-conﬁdence underlying the liberal-universalist War on
Drugs have dissipated, creating the need for a different approach. Bargués-
Pedreny and Schmidt, likewise, draw attention to the loss of conﬁdence in our
ability to solve the problem of climate change. Yet, Bargués-Pedreny and
Schmidt are also optimistic concerning the possibilities that exist even in the
midst of a loss of conﬁdence. The current, more afﬁrmative approach, they
argue, is enthusiastic about the possibilities of action but does not promise to
solve the problems that we are facing: “what is being done matters less than the
idea that something is being done, that something happens, moves”.7 This is an
afﬁrmation of action in the present without guarantee of results or success.
While Bargués-Pedreny and Schmidt understand afﬁrmation as opening up new
possibilities, for Finkenbusch, resilience discourse ultimately “welcomes the world
the way it is” and therefore fails to go beyond neoliberalism.8 Similarly, David
Chandler shows how the bulk of current approaches to the Anthropocene does
not challenge the present or offer possibilities for alternative futures. Instead,
they afﬁrm the world as it currently exists. In the Anthropocene, critique comes
to appear as a limited way of engaging with the world because the parameters
within which critique used to be practiced arguably no longer exist.9 The distinc-
tion between the present and an “outside” or an “away” that enables critique—
at least the modern variant of it that Chandler focuses on—is arguably not
tenable anymore. Instead, the truth that we are called on to afﬁrm is that
humans have created the problem of the Anthropocene but it is not ours to
solve. The Anthropocene cannot be ﬁxed—it has to be afﬁrmed.
Chandler uses Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s book The Mushroom at the End of the
World (2015) to identify some of the characteristics of the current “ethos of afﬁrma-
tion”. Tsing’s book is indeed very ﬁtting for illustrating some of the problems of this
ethos. While Tsing’s ethnography of the matsutake mushroom commerce is won-
derfully rich, the book’s argument concerning “life in capitalist ruins” is based
5. Peter Finkenbusch, “On the Road to Afﬁrmation: Facilitating Urban Resilience in the Americas”,
Global Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019).
6. Pol Bargués-Pedreny and Jessica Schmidt, “Learning to be Postmodern in an All TooModernWorld:
‘Whatever Action’ in International Climate Change Imaginaries”, Global Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019).
7. Ibid.
8. Finkenbusch, op. cit.
9. David Chandler, “The Transvaluation of Critique in the Anthropocene”, Global Society, Vol. 33, No. 1
(2019).
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on an afﬁrmation of precarity that strangely both acknowledges and disregards the
role that precarity plays in sustaining contemporary capitalism. Tsing recognises
the precarious conditions that commercial mushroom pickers live in. Yet, this
does not lead her to a political analysis or a critical questioning of the operation
of the contemporary global economy. Instead, she suggests embracing precarity
as a fundamental condition of existence.
We hear about precarity in the news every day. People lose their jobs or get
angry because they never had them. Gorillas and river porpoises hover at
the edge of extinction. Rising seas swamp whole Paciﬁc islands. But most
of the time we imagine such precarity to be an exception to how the world
works. It’s what “drops out” from the system. What if, as I’m suggesting,
precarity is the condition of our time—or, to put it another way, what if our
time is ripe for sensing precarity?10
Tsing suggests that everything is indeterminate, in ﬂux, and evolving, and she is
expecting this to “sound odd” to the reader because we have presumably
assumed capitalism to operate through uniformity, homogenisation, and standard-
isation. Afﬁrming diversity, contingency, precarity, and surprise is Tsing’s answer
to homogenisation. To make the most of it, we need to approach precarity with
curiosity and imagination: “Precarious living is always an adventure”.11 While
Tsing appears to think of her approach as revolutionary, it is reproducing a con-
ception of life that is entirely compatible with and, indeed, promoted and produced
by the way in which contemporary capitalism operates. Neoliberal capitalism is
predicated on the proliferation and appropriation of difference. The neoliberal
economy is in a constant state of emergency from which it does not even try to
escape. Instead, it spontaneously organises itself in it.12 Being secured as a
subject of neoliberalism means accepting that the environment in which one lives
is contingent and precarious, and therefore requires constant reshaping of the
self. Crucial for this is that the need to recognise contingency concerns not only
what we can or cannot know of the world or of its future, but also the way in
which people need to conceive of their own life in a rapidly changing world. To
survive in what is taken to be an increasingly contingent world, contingency has
to be accepted as constitutive of one’s subjectivity.13
Part of the appeal of the notions of contingency and indeterminacy is that they
appear to reﬂect the vital dynamic of life. Particularly as a consequence of the
shift from Newtonian and Darwinian science to complexity science, “life” has
come to be understood as self-organising, open, adaptive, and contingent. Biologi-
cal life is conceived as being constantly exposed to deviances that threaten its equi-
librium.14 In the time of climate change, we are made more aware of this than ever.
10. Tsing, op cit., p. 20.
11. Ibid., p. 163.
12. See BrianMassumi, “National Enterprise Emergency: Steps Toward an Ecology of Powers”, Theory,
Culture & Society, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2009), pp. 153–185.
13. For an extended version of this argument, see Suvi Alt, “Beyond the Biopolitics of Capability and
Choice in Human Development: Being, Decision and World”,Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
Vol. 44, No. 1 (2015), pp. 69–88.
14. Maria Muhle, “A Genealogy of Biopolitics: The Notion of Life in Canguilhem and Foucault”, in
Vanessa Lemm and Miguel Vatter (eds.), The Government of Life: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Neoliberalism
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), p. 86.
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Furthermore, if it is true that the Anthropocene has made it impossible to dis-
tinguish between humans and the environment, then presumably this also
means that it is equally implausible to distinguish between biological and socio-
political concepts. Yet, the implications of uncritically afﬁrming the truth of
notions deriving from the natural sciences as the truth of our political and social
existence should give us pause. If science has shown “life” to be contingent,
open, and self-organising, we should still question the political implications of
assuming this to be a generalised ontological condition also politically and socially.
In the contemporary political economy, an uncritical afﬁrmation of the contingency
of life reinforces the status quo instead of challenging it.15 Hence, the way in which
various performances of afﬁrmative critique “linger in the space of indetermi-
nacy”16 does not have the kind of disruptive or subversive impact that authors
such as Tsing assume it to have.
A further problemwith claiming that we are living in “a global state of precarity”
and that we need to understand “precarity as an earthwide condition”17 is the
obvious point that not everyone is equally precarious. Precarity and vulnerability
are distributed in highly unequal ways, and approaches that seek to afﬁrm them
as some kind of a generalised ontological truth risk missing actually existing
social, economic, and political conditions: If everything is open, contingent, and
“moving”, how are patterns of inequality so persistent? Doerthe Rosenow argues
that decolonial thought makes important contributions in this regard. On the one
hand, decolonial approaches strive towards “an afﬁrmation of the plurality and
complexity of what is”.18 On the other hand, decolonial thought is also a project
of critique, understood in terms of “an analysis of actual (historical) structures of
domination”.19 Prioritising afﬁrmation should thus never come at the expense of
analysing actually existing relations of domination. In other words, both critique
and afﬁrmation are needed.
In Joe Hoover’s piece, afﬁrmation is portrayed differently but his conclusion is
similar to Rosenow’s. Hoover develops an approach to global justice that involves
both an afﬁrmation of the lived experience of injustice and a critique of the power
relations that shape those experiences. Such an approach requires us “to consider
how the distribution of power and privilege leads to injustice, and how its redistri-
bution is necessary for global justice”.20 As such, Hoover’s approach conceives of
afﬁrmation as being necessarily connected to an ongoing process of critique and
as having a speciﬁc object. Here, afﬁrmation is not so much a general ethos but
rather a call to take seriously the experiences of those who suffer from domination
and oppression.
The attention to structural and social relations that Hoover calls for is precisely
what Kai Koddenbrock and Mario Schmidt identify as going missing in the
current afﬁrmative turn. Koddenbrock and Schmidt argue that afﬁrmation often
15. See Alt, op. cit.
16. Ned Dostaler, “On Hope and Indeterminacy”, Dialogues, Cultural Anthropology (June 2017), avail-
able: <https://culanth.org/ﬁeldsights/1131-on-hope-and-indeterminacy> (accessed 10 August 2018).
17. Tsing, op. cit., pp. 4–6.
18. Doerthe Rosenow, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Con-
troversy and Beyond”, Global Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019).
19. Ibid.
20. Joe Hoover, “Developing a Situationist Global Justice Theory: From an Architectonic to a Consum-
matory Approach”, Global Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019).
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comes in the form of the acceptance of a loss of one’s world. A good example of this
is Roy Scranton’s popular book Learning to Die in the Anthropocene (2015) which
suggests that living in the Anthropocene means learning how to die: “Learning
to die means learning to let go of the ego, the idea of the self, the future, certainty,
attachment, the pursuit of pleasure, permanence, stability. Learning to let go of sal-
vation. Learning to let go of hope”.21 As Koddenbrock and Schmidt suggest, afﬁr-
mation then appears as “a leap of faith towards an unknown undertaken not
because that unknown is inherently promising, but because what one knows
already has been or allegedly is destroyed”.22 Yet, there is a crucial political
problem in the cases that Koddenbrock and Schmidt analyse: The leap of faith
towards the unknown is to be taken based on the revelation provided by a
preacher-like ﬁgure, rather than relying on the idea that the changing character
of the world is accessible to everyone through a critical engagement with it.23
Hence, in some of the moves of the afﬁrmative turn, social and historical relations
and even human action disappear, and truth becomes something that is revealed
simply by referring to its encompassing presence.24 Yet, as Koddenbrock and
Schmidt point out, forms of critique are themselves historical, emerging from a
movement between human thought and its social and material conditions.25 The
interesting question then is, what is it about the present that has made afﬁrmation
appear as the most (or even the only) plausible mode of approaching the world.
Koddenbrock and Schmidt do not pursue this question very far but they note
the 1990s and 2000s’ depoliticisation and acceptance of “there is no alternative”
as playing a role here. Additionally, and perhaps even more obviously, the
current perception of “there is no choice” comes from a recognition of “the
reality of the planet”.26 The “new planetary real” is arguably such that some free-
doms and political choices cannot, or must not, be available to us anymore.27
The discourses of necessity that have pervaded both economics and ecology—
and interestingly coexist with the ontologies of contingency and indeterminacy—
go some way towards explaining the conditions of possibility of the turn to afﬁrma-
tion. This attention to conditions of possibility of course betrays my allegiance to
“the tired routines of most social theories”, as Bruno Latour puts it.28 While the
critical attitude is “a ﬂight into the conditions of possibility of a given matter of
fact”, Latour’s alternative is an inquiry into “how many participants are gathered
in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence”.29 For Latour, an interest
21. Roy Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reﬂections on the End of a Civilization
(San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2015), p. 92.
22. Kai Koddenbrock and Mario Schmidt “Against Understanding: The Techniques of Shock and Awe
in Jesuit Theology, Neoliberal Thought and Timothy Morton’s Philosophy of Hyperobjects”, Global




26. See Anthony Burke, Stefanie Fishel, Audra Mitchell, Simon Dalby, and Daniel J. Levine, “Planet
Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3
(2016), pp. 499–523.
27. Ibid., p. 507. For a critique of this position, see David Chandler, Erika Cudworth, and Stephen
Hobden, “Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Liberal Cosmopolitan IR: A Response to Burke et al.’
‘Planet Politics’”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2017), pp. 190–208.
28. Bruno Latour, “WhyHas Critique Run Out of Steam? FromMatters of Fact toMatters of Concern”,
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 30 (Winter 2004), p. 245.
29. Ibid., p. 246. Original emphases.
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in the conditions of possibility of facts has meant moving away from facts, when we
should be moving closer to them. The latter would mean creating, assembling, and
composing, instead of debunking, undermining, and judging things. An echo of
such a form of critique can also be found in Michel Foucault’s reﬂections on the
role of the critic:
I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge
but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light
ﬁres, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in
the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgments but signs of
existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it
would invent them sometimes—all the better. All the better. Criticism
that hands down sentences sends me to sleep; I’d like a criticism of scintil-
lating leaps of the imagination. It would not be sovereign or dressed in red.
It would bear the lightning of possible storms.30
While Foucault’s ethos here is quite similar to that of those who now prefer afﬁrma-
tion to critique, for others, this quote is probably a reminder of what was wrong
with poststructuralist critique in the ﬁrst place. Approaches drawing on some
form ofMarxist legacy will have similar problems with contemporary calls for afﬁr-
mation as they did with the forms of poststructuralist critique that draw on Fou-
cault, Jacques Derrida, and other related thinkers. What Koddenbrock calls “the
paralysis of large parts of ‘radical’ IR”31 is then due not to too much critique and
too little afﬁrmation but rather a consequence of the limits of the notions of critique
that are currently prevalent. Koddenbrock locates these limits in Latourian and
Foucauldian approaches’ unwillingness to recognise totality and to engage in a
totalising strategy of critique. This means that they are not able to grasp the sys-
temic logics of capitalism because they focus on contingent details and unstable
assemblages, refusing to engage with capitalism as such. Furthermore, following
Karl Marx and Theodor Adorno, Koddenbrock emphasises that totality is a critical
category—not an afﬁrmative one.32 The character of capitalist social totality is a
problem to be overcome, not a truth to be embraced.
In Gideon Baker’s reading of the limits of critique, both those action-oriented cri-
tiques that pass judgement on the world and those deconstructive ones that refrain
from doing so remain caught in the metaphysical problem of government that
Christianity has bequeathed to Western thought.33 For Baker, critique is limited
because it judges the world according to a measure that exists outside the world.
The discrepancy between the actually existing world and the ideal world is what
invites governance. While Chandler sees the notion of an “outside” or an
“away” as enabling critique, Baker points out that this necessarily also produces
governance. Afﬁrmation, on the contrary, rejects nothing in the world and it
adds nothing onto the world but it is nevertheless transformative.34 How exactly
30. Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher”, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Essential Works of Fou-
cault 1954–1984 (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 323.
31. Kai Koddenbrock, “Strategies of Critique in International Relations: From Foucault and Latour
Towards Marx”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2015), p. 257.
32. Ibid., p. 255.
33. Gideon Baker, “Critique, Use andWorld in Giorgio Agamben’s Genealogy of Government”, Global
Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019).
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this happens cannot be articulated within the parameters of what would generally
be recognised as politics because this would require relying on a notion of a meta-
physical subject acting on the world, which reproduces rather than solves the
problem of governance. Baker is thus going further than his Foucauldian col-
leagues for whom the problem would rather be one of “how not to be governed
like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such objective in
mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by
them”.35 Rather, the problem here is governance as such.
While the form of critique that Baker is primarily taking issue with relies on jud-
gement, much of poststructuralist critique, often drawing on Foucault, has either
explicitly or implicitly refrained from understanding critique as a form of judge-
ment. Nevertheless, Baker’s afﬁrmation is not concerned with poststructuralism’s
alternative to judgement: the deconstructive attention to difference; that which con-
founds any ﬁnal order. According to Baker, such critique, too, remains caught in
conceiving of the world as somehow more than what it appears to be. Instead,
the world is to be afﬁrmed as being nothing but its modes of being. But how
could such an account avoid the status quo preserving effect of afﬁrmation that
many of the other authors of this special issue point out? And how does this
account allow for addressing the problems—domination, inequality, injustice—
that have also been raised? As far as those problems are seen as having their
origins in historically speciﬁc social, political, and economic forces, it is difﬁcult
to see how they could be addressed through this form of afﬁrmation in any
immediate way. Nevertheless, the problem is also posed differently here. Baker
suggests that afﬁrmation does not reproduce the status quo when it operates
through the new use of that which exists. Drawing the concept of “use” from
Giorgio Agamben, Baker argues that use does not arrive from outside the
current world but neither does it simply amount to a repetition of the same. Free
use opens up modes of being in a way that is transformative but not premised
on the “must-be” of action-oriented critique.36 While Baker leaves the practical
applications of such “free use” largely in suspense, Agamben’s examples of it
include play, dance, and poetry. “Rendering inoperative the biological, economic,
and social operations, they show what the human body can do, opening it to a
new possible use”, Agamben explains.37 Although Agamben’s discussion of use
is largely focused on aesthetic forms of existence, he nevertheless argues that use
has the potential to deactivate the powers of economics, law, and politics.38 To
this end, “we must always wrest from the apparatuses—from all apparatuses—
the possibility of use that they have captured”, Agamben states.39 Nevertheless,
Agamben, too, remains relatively silent when it comes to considering the systemic,
social, political, and economic conditions within which such use is to take place.
34. Ibid.
35. Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?”, in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.), The Politics of Truth (Los Angeles:
Semiotext(e), 2007), p. 44. Original emphasis.
36. Baker, op. cit.
37. Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Destituent Power?”, trans. Stephanie Wakeﬁeld, Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2014), p. 70.
38. Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), p. 76.
39. Ibid., p. 92.
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Conclusion
While it is both the modernist forms of critique and deconstruction that are now
considered as limited, and “afﬁrmation” is put forward as a solution to their short-
comings, we should remember that these approaches also contained their own
notions of afﬁrmation. Modernist critique was premised on afﬁrming the truth of
values such as progress, emancipation, or freedom, while Derrida, conversely,
saw the work of deconstruction in terms of an afﬁrmation that aims to pass
beyond “man”, “humanism”, “foundation”, and “origin”. This “afﬁrmation of
the play of the world […] determines the noncenter as otherwise than as loss of
the center”.40 Deconstruction, thus, contributed to “an afﬁrmation of the world
in its unpredictability, contingency and interdependency”.41 In this regard, contem-
porary calls for afﬁrmation seem closer to the ethos of deconstructive critique than
to its modernist counterpart. The afﬁrmation of the contingency of life and world is
one of the points where various contemporary posthuman and new materialist
approaches converge with their poststructuralist predecessors. It is not always
easy to see how contemporary afﬁrmation necessarily even substantively differs
from poststructuralist critique, apart from claims that it is more attuned to the
material and somehow less pessimistic and less withdrawn.
In fact, one key aspect of the afﬁrmative approach appears to be its more positive
“mood”.42 While moods should generally not be conﬂated with affects, for the pur-
poses of this text, it is worth remembering that in cultural and social theory, the
“afﬁrmative turn” has been closely connected to the “turn to affect”. In this
regard, we might brieﬂy highlight the work of Rosi Braidotti as well as Sara
Ahmed’s critique of it as a reminder of some of the possible pitfalls of afﬁrmation.
In general terms, Braidotti’s afﬁrmative politics is about “trusting the untapped
possibilities” that exist in the present historical situation.43 She posits a vitalist,
materialist, relational ontology that afﬁrms movement, process, and becoming. A
key element of her politics is an “ethics of joy and afﬁrmation” that functions
through the transformation of negative affects into positive ones.44 “Joyful or posi-
tive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode”,
Braidotti explains.45 This means that subjects are to pursue self-transformation in
ways that afﬁrm positivity. Bad feelings are framed here as obstacles, as that
which gets in the way of subjects getting beyond.46 Ahmed suggests that Braidotti
is too quick to seek the transformation of pain and hurt to positivity. Instead, we
should aim to produce critical understandings of the reasons why some bodies
are more vulnerable to harm than others. According to Ahmed, afﬁrmative
ethics underestimates the difﬁculty of giving sustained attention to suffering and
it allows historical forms of injustice to disappear from view.47
40. Jacques Derrida,Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2001),
p. 369.
41. James J. Dicenso, “Deconstruction and the Philosophy of Religion: World Afﬁrmation and Cri-
tique”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1992), p. 36.
42. Bargués-Pedreny and Schmidt, op. cit.
43. Braidotti, op. cit., p. 194.
44. Ibid.
45. Rosi Braidotti, “Afﬁrmation Versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates”, Symposium,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (2006), p. 238.
46. Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 215.
47. Ibid., p. 216.
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In other words, afﬁrmation as a “positive mood” risks repeating the same
problem as the afﬁrmation of precarity, contingency, and indeterminacy. Afﬁrma-
tion—even if it is the afﬁrmation of becoming, of change, of multiplicity, and so
on—is insufﬁcient if it remains oblivious to its own conditions of possibility. Yet,
my purpose is not to discourage those fellow academics who long for something
more positive, optimistic, and joyful than the forms of critique that we are used
to. But insofar as the turn to afﬁrmation is not just about the mood with which
one conducts one’s scholarly praxis but also involves a more general conception
of subjects’ way of relating to the world and to each other, it is important to note
that afﬁrmation may also come at a price. The afﬁrmation of the unstable, indeter-
minate, interrelated, and precarious character of present life and world is at once
also an afﬁrmation of neoliberal capitalism. This does not mean that the former
is nothing but the latter. But it does mean that the “afﬁrmative ethos” is easily
co-opted if it does not come with a critical analysis of existing relations of power
and domination. None of this is meant to diminish the importance of afﬁrmation.
In fact, afﬁrmation is crucial for political praxis. Rather, I suggest that we need to
pay attention to what truth is afﬁrmed and with what political effects, particularly
when afﬁrmation is referred to as an “ethos”, a “mood”, or a “spirit”.
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